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Abstract— This paper introduces the safety controller archi-
tecture as a runtime assurance mechanism for system spec-
ifications expressed as safety properties in Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL). The safety controller has three fundamental
components: a performance controller, a backup controller,
and an assurance mechanism. The assurance mechanism uses a
monitor, constructed as a finite state machine (FSM), to analyze
a suggested performance control input and search for system
trajectories that are bad prefixes of the system specification. A
fault flag from the assurance mechanism denotes a potentially
dangerous future system state and triggers a sequence of inputs
that is guaranteed to keep the system safe for all time. A
case study is presented which details the construction and
implementation of a safety controller on a non-deterministic
cyber-physical system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern cyber-physical systems (CPS) are complex and
sometimes do not behave as expected. Correctness can be
partially addressed with offline verification, however, the
end-to-end verification of an entire system is often prevented
by its complexity. In order to compensate for the lack of
assurances, it is desirable to enforce correctness online.
For purely cyber systems, runtime correctness can be
checked online using monitors [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. In this
context, correctness is evaluated with respect to a temporal
logic specification; a monitor observes the temporal behav-
iors of the cyber system and notifies the system operator if a
fault is suspected. Such monitors are convenient for system
verification because they can be algorithmically generated
from temporal logic specifications. Monitors fail, however,
to assure correct system behavior; monitors can only detect
system faults and do not have the ability to intervene. As an
alternative, edit automata read a sequence of system inputs
and, should it recognize a harmful string in that sequence,
edits the control input before it is passed on in the software
[6]. Edit automata are formed corresponding to temporal
logic specifications, however, it is unclear how hard it is to
generate an edit automaton given such a specification. It was
shown by [7], for instance, that an edit automaton for a given
specification is not unique, and that the algorithm presented
in [6] for constructing edit automata is not optimal.
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For physical control systems, runtime assurance can be
performed by identifying a controlled forward invariant re-
gion of the state space, and then ensuring that the system
does not exceed the boundary of this region. Verification
techniques of this nature include level set methods [8],
barrier certificate based methods [9], and certain model
predictive control (MPC) based methods [10], [11]. Com-
puting invariant sets, however, is generally computationally
expensive, and moreover, this approach typically is only well
suited to analyze invariance conditions or reach conditions.
CPS could, for instance, use an invariance check to avoid
stationary obstacles or to patrol a static region of the state
space; however, this method is ineffective for more complex
system properties, for example, properties which specify that
system goals are met in a certain order.
It is not overtly clear how one might combine results
for purely cyber systems with results for physical systems
in order to ensure correct behavior of modern CPS against
complex specifications. For example, by the time a monitor
recognizes that a physical system is about to violate its oper-
ating specification, the system may have entered an invariant
region of the state space from which it is impossible to satisfy
the system specification going forward. A basic idea that
has emerged in different contexts is to verify correct system
behavior at runtime, and then protect the potentially faulty
complex controller with a less sophisticated, but demonstra-
bly safer, backup controller. This technique is referred to as
“runtime assurance” or the Simplex Architecture [12].
In this paper, we investigate runtime assurance for system
specifications that can be expressed in Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL). In particular, we restrict to the class of safety
properties. An LTL property is a safety property if each
invalid infinite trace contains a finite prefix which cannot
be extended to any valid, satisfying trace [13]. For instance,
completing a set of CPS tasks in a specified order is a safety
property, as is returning to a region periodically. We restrict
to safety properties due to certain technical properties of
monitors; however, these technical properties correspond to
reasonable restrictions on the ability of any runtime assur-
ance mechanism. Informally, if an LTL specification is not a
safety property, then it contains a liveness condition requiring
that some desirable property eventually becomes true. For
example, reaching a goal region is a liveness property. Ensur-
ing that a cyber-physical system does not violate a liveness
property appears to be essentially equivalent to solving the
controller synthesis problem, which we expressly attempt to
avoid in this paper. We elaborate on the justification and
implications of restricting to safety properties in Section 2.
For system specifications that are expressible as safety
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Fig. 1: Safety Controller Architecture
properties, we introduce the safety controller as a provably
correct runtime assurance mechanism. The safety controller
(Figure 1) has three fundamental components: a performance
controller, a backup controller and an assurance mechanism.
The assurance mechanism uses a monitor automaton to
analyze a suggested performance control input and determine
whether the resulting system trajectory is a bad prefix for
the system specification. A fault flag from the assurance
mechanism denotes a potentially dangerous future system
state and triggers an input sequence which is guaranteed to
keep the system safe for all time.
The backup controller is characterized by a subset of the
product of the system and monitor state spaces where correct
performance can be provided on an infinite time horizon; we
refer to this subset as the high assurance region. Importantly,
the assurance mechanism allows the performance controller
to steer the system outside its known high assurance region,
provided that the performance controller can demonstrate
safety beforehand. This creates a trade-off between the a
priori development of a backup controller and the real-time
burden placed on the performance controller.
This paper is organized in the following way. We provide
a discussion on the construction and application of monitor
automata in Section 2. Section 3 presents the problem formu-
lation and then introduces the safety controller architecture as
a correct-by-construction runtime assurance mechanism for
deterministic system models. This architecture is expanded
in Section 4, to assure non-deterministic CPS system models.
We provide a discussion on the trade-off between offline
platform development and online assurance in Section 5,
and the paper concludes with a final case study, provided
in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES ON MONITORING FOR LINEAR
TEMPORAL LOGIC PROPERTIES
In this section, we introduce monitor automata as a run-
time verification tool from automata based model checking.
A. Monitor Construction in LTL3
To formally describe the execution of a CPS, we encode
system events as atomic propositions; a sequence of events,
or a word, therefore denotes the progression of the system
through time. We use AP to denote a set of atomic proposi-
tions, Σ = 2AP to denote a finite alphabet, and Σ∗ and Σω
to denote the sets of finite and infinite system traces over
Σ, respectively. System properties are specified in Linear
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Fig. 2: Monitor Automaton Mϕ where ϕ = ∅ ∨ ©a is
an LTL property evaluated over Σ = {∅, a}. Monitor states
q> and q⊥ output true and false, respectively, and q0, · · · , q3
output inconclusive.
Temporal Logic (LTL). For an in depth discussion of the
LTL semantics, we refer the reader to [14] Section 2.1.
Consider an LTL specification ϕ and a finite path fragment
w ∈ Σ∗. Note that there may be no continuations of w which
satisfy ϕ, or equivalently, the system may have reached a
state where it can no longer satisfy its specification under
any possible future execution. We therefore introduce the
definitions of bad and good prefixes in order to describe the
set of finite words from which it is impossible to satisfy or
violate a system specification.
Definition 1 (Good and Bad Prefixes). Consider a finite word
w1 ∈ Σ∗ and an LTL property ϕ. w1 is said to be a good
prefix for ϕ if w1w2 |= ϕ for all w2 ∈ Σω . Similarly, w1 is
said to be a bad prefix for ϕ if w1w2 6|= ϕ for all w2 ∈ Σω .
Further, we introduce the notion of a truth value, in order to
classify whether a finite word is a good or bad prefix for ϕ.
Definition 2 (LTL3 Semantics, [2] Section 2.2). Let w ∈ Σ∗
denote a finite word. The truth value of an LTL3 formula
ϕ with respect to w, denoted [w |= ϕ], is an element of
B3 = {>,⊥, ? } defined as follows:
[w |= ϕ] =

> if ∀σ ∈ Σω : wσ |= ϕ
⊥ if ∀σ ∈ Σω : wσ 6|= ϕ
? otherwise.
Equivalently, the truth value ϕ with respect to w is true “>”
if w is a good prefix for ϕ, false “⊥” if w is a bad prefix
for ϕ, and inconclusive “? ” otherwise.
Finally, we formalize the automata-based monitoring pro-
cedure for LTL3 (Definition 3). We refer the reader to [2]
for a comprehensive discussion on monitor construction, and
we provide a sample monitor construction in Figure 2.
Definition 3 (Monitors in LTL3). For a given property ϕ a
monitor automaton Mϕ is a finite state machine that reads
finite words w ∈ Σ∗ and outputs [w |= ϕ].
Note that a monitor state with output > or ⊥ will always
be a trap state, as, for any LTL property, any continuation of
a good/bad prefix for that property will also be a good/bad
prefix. Consequently, a monitor Mϕ will never have more
than one state with output > and one state with output ⊥
after minimization. We therefore use q> and q⊥ to denote
monitor states with outputs > and ⊥, respectively.
B. Monitoring Safety Properties
Given a LTL property ϕ, the monitor automaton Mϕ
may not be able to reach all of B3. For instance, a monitor
Mϕ for ϕ = a, Σ = {∅, a}, does not include a state
q>. We therefore focus the scope of our study to LTL
properties which guarantee certain monitor output behaviors.
Specifically, we recall the definition of safety properties [15].
Definition 4 (Safety Property). An LTL property ϕsafe is
said to be a safety property if all words which violate ϕsafe
contain a bad prefix for ϕsafe.
LTL safety properties make up a broad class of system
specifications; for example, ϕ = ∅ ∨ ©a (Figure 2) is a
safety property in LTL. Furthermore, applying Definition 2.3,
we can guarantee system safety by ensuring that the trace of
every finite prefix trajectory does not contain a bad prefix
for ϕsafe. We formalize this result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. An infinite word w ∈ Σω satisfies ϕsafe if
[wˆ |= ϕsafe] 6=⊥ for all prefixes wˆ ∈ Pref(w).
Note that a monitor Mϕsafe , for a safety property ϕsafe
not semantically equal to true, is guaranteed to have a state
with output ⊥. Moreover, we can verify system trajectories
against ϕsafe by ensuring the system run overMϕsafe never
enters q⊥.
III. THE SAFETY CONTROLLER ARCHITECTURE
Here we apply monitor automata in a framework which
enforces system objectives at runtime. For system objectives
which are expressible as safety properties in LTL, we create
a notion of system safety and describe a control architecture
which is guaranteed to keep the system safe for all time. We
refer to this control architecture as a safety controller. The
safety controller has three fundamental components: a high-
performance controller, a backup controller, and an assur-
ance mechanism. The assurance mechanism is implemented
through two algorithms which ensure system safety by
continually choosing between the high-performance control
input and the high-assurance control input.
A. Preliminaries and Notation
Consider a discrete-time non-deterministic control system
x+ = f(x, u, d) (1)
where, xk ∈ X ⊆ Rn, uk ∈ U ⊆ Rm and dk ∈ D ⊂
Rp represent the system state, control input, and a non-
deterministic bounded disturbance, at a time k ∈ N≥0,
respectively. We make no assumptions on the stochastic
properties of dk within D, i.e. dk is not assumed to conform
to any probability distribution.
Associated with the system (1) is a set of atomic proposi-
tions AP and a labeling function L : X → 2AP . As before,
let Σ = 2AP denote a finite alphabet, and let Σ∗ and Σω
denote the sets of finite and infinite traces of the system
(2) over Σ, respectively. Additionally, let ϕ be property
in LTL. We aim to construct a string of inputs u0, u1, · · ·
which, when fed to the system, will create a system trace
L(x0 x1 · · ·) |= ϕ.
B. Assurance Through Monitoring
We first consider the case with no disturbance d. After
developing a general framework for approaching this de-
terministic formulation, we return to the non-deterministic
setting of (1). To that end, consider a system
x+ = f(x, u) (2)
xk ∈ X ⊆ Rn, uk ∈ U ⊆ Rm, k ∈ N.
We aim to ensure that a safety property ϕ ∈ LTL is satisfied
over a (infinite) system trace. Following Proposition 1, we
say that a finite system trajectory x0, · · · , xk is safe if
[L(x0 · · ·xk) |= ϕ] ∈ {>, ? }, and unsafe if [L(x0 · · ·xk) |=
ϕ] = ⊥. A controller which is implemented on the system
must first ensure the system stays safe before pursuing any
auxiliary system objectives, such as enforcing optimality
constraints or attempting to satisfy additional LTL properties.
Assume we have access to a controller which is claimed
to be able to keep the system safe, while also possibly
meeting some auxiliary system objective. We denote this a
performance controller. Here, the performance controller is
characterized by three assumptions:
Assumption III.1. At each time k, the performance con-
troller proposes a control input to be applied to the system.
Assumption III.2. If requested, the performance con-
troller can propose future inputs u˜k, · · · , u˜k+Nmax , for some
Nmax ∈ N, such that at time j, k ≤ j ≤ k + Nmax the
performance controller intends to apply u˜j to the system. The
performance controller is not obligated to use these control
inputs at future time steps.
Assumption III.3. The performance controller might bear
faulty, i.e. applying the performance control input to (2) may
eventually cause the system to violate its specification ϕ.
This definition of the performance controller is quite
broad and encompasses general unverified feedback control
laws. For example, a human operator, whose effectiveness
cannot be verified a priori, can be thought of as a perfor-
mance controller for a manned CPS. Despite the lack of
global assurances, we assume that certain aspects of the
performance control law make it preferable if safety can
be determined beforehand. For example, the performance
control may be designed to optimize some objective or
achieve some auxiliary goal.
We additionally assume the existence of a controller which
is known to satisfy the safety objective, but might be limited
in abilities or performance. We denote this mechanism a
backup controller, formalized next.
Definition 5 (Backup Controller and High Assurance Re-
gion). For a system of the form (1), a safety property ϕ ∈
LTL, and a corresponding monitor Mϕ = (Σ, Q, q0, δ, λ),
let S = X ×Q denote the total state space of the combined
system and monitor. A backup controller is characterized
by a subset of the state space Sb ⊆ S such that for any
(x, q) ∈ Sb, there exists an infinite sequence of control inputs
known to the backup controller such that the resulting infinite
horizon system trace satisfies ϕ. Sb is referred to as the high
assurance region of the backup controller.
Let us fix a safety property ϕ, a corresponding monitor
Mϕ = (Σ, Q, q0, δ, λ), a backup controller and a high
assurance region Sb for the remainder of this section. We
recall the problem formulation: given a system of the form
(2), generate a sequence of control inputs which, when fed
to the system, will create a system trace which satisfies
ϕ. Trivially, the system can be kept safe for all time by
applying the backup control input to the system at each time
step. This method of input generation, however, restricts the
system to operating inside the high assurance region, and
removes the possibility of reaching any auxiliary goals. For
this reason, we interpret our problem formulation as follows:
create a logical architecture which chooses whether to apply
the performance control input or the backup control input
to the system, at each time step, such that the resulting
system trace satisfies ϕ. In this case, whenever possible, the
chosen input should be that of the performance controller.
We refer to this embedded decision logic as the assurance
mechanism of the safety controller. Importantly, we give the
system the ability to leave Sb by applying the performance
control input to the system in instances where the assurance
mechanism can provide assurance in the form of a suggested
input sequence, certifying that the system can return to the
high assurance region once it has left. We justify this decision
with Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Let x0, · · · , xk denote a finite trajectory of
system (1), and let q0, · · · , qk be the corresponding run of
the trajectory over Mϕ. If (xk, qk) ∈ Sb, then L(x0 · · ·xk)
is not a bad prefix for ϕ.
It follows from Proposition 2 that if the performance
controller is able to suggest a path back to the high assurance
region Sb from every point along a system trajectory, then
the performance control input is safe. We therefore create a
procedure which takes an initial state (x, q) ∈ X × Q and
returns a finite sequence of control inputs µr such that:
1) µr = ∅ signifies a fault in the performance controller,
and
2) µr = u0, · · · , uk signifies that applying the sequence
of control inputs will return the system to Sb.
For an initial system monitor state, we use the term recovery
input sequence to denote such a sequence of control inputs
which drive the system state into Sb.
We implement this procedure by calling RECOVERY(x, q),
provided in Algorithm 1. Succinctly, RECOVERY(x, q) sim-
ulates the system dynamics using the current system monitor
state and a non-empty sequence of suggested future per-
formance control inputs; if the future system monitor state
is contained in Sb, then the suggested input sequence is
returned, and, if not, the null sequence is returned, signaling
a system fault. Therefore, if the performance controller is
not faulty, then the output of Algorithm 1 is a non-empty
recovery input sequence for the current system monitor state.
Algorithm 1 Generate A Non-Empty Recovery Input Se-
quence for the Current State
input : a current state (x, q) ∈ S
output: a sequence of control inputs µr
1: function RECOVERY(x, q)
2: Initialize: x˜0 = x, q˜0 = q, i = 0
3: while (i ≤ Nmax) and (q˜i 6= q⊥) do
4: u˜i ← Request Next Input
5: x˜i+1 ← f(x˜i, u˜i)
6: q˜i+1 ← δ(q˜i, L(x˜i+1))
7: if (x˜i+1, q˜i+1) ∈ Sb then
8: return µr = u˜0, · · · , u˜i
9: i← i+ 1
10: return µr = ∅
11: end function
We use Algorithm 1 to design a logical architecture for our
safety controller as follows:
1) At each time k the decision logic calls
RECOVERY(xk, qk) and stores the output in a
variable µr.
2) If µr is non-empty, then u0 is applied to the system
and u1, · · · , uj is stored to memory.
3) If µr = ∅ then the performance controller has sug-
gested an input sequence that cannot be verified. The
memorized recovery input sequence is applied to return
the system to Sb, and the backup control input is then
applied for all future time.
We implement this procedure through Algorithm 2. Algo-
rithms 2 calls Algorithm 1 once per discrete time step,
prompting the performance controller for a string of future
inputs which steer the system to Sb. The performance
controller will be considered functional if such a sequence
is found. In the case that the performance controller is
functional, the aforementioned procedure will create a finite
series of inputs known to create a safe trajectory, but then
only apply the first input to the system. In this way, the
method resembles a model predictive control framework.
Note that the assurance mechanism will need to simulate the
system dynamics as many as Nmax + 1 times per discrete
system timestep, therefore it is assumed that the assurance
mechanism has the necessary functionality to perform these
computations. Choosing control inputs using Algorithm 2
guarantees system safety for all time. We formalize this result
in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Runtime Assurance for Deterministic CPS). Let
ϕ ∈ LTL be a safety property, and let w = L(x0 x1 · · ·) be
the trace of an infinite trajectory resulting from a sequence of
inputs chosen using Algorithm 2. If the system is initialized
in the high assurance region, i.e. (x0, q0) ∈ Sb, then w |= ϕ.
In Section 4, we expand upon the results of this section
in order to design a runtime assurance procedure for non-
deterministic systems. To that end, we omit a proof for The-
orem 1, with the knowledge that a later theorem encapsulates
Algorithm 2 Runtime Assurance for Discrete-Time Control
Systems
1: µr ← RECOVERY(x0, q0)
2: while (µr 6= ∅) do
3: Apply u0 to system
4: Store u1, · · · , uj to Memory
5: (x, q)← CURRENT STATE
6: µr ← RECOVERY(x, q)
7: Apply Recovery Input Sequence to system
8: while (True) do
9: Apply BACKUP INPUT to system
the findings of this section (Theorem 2).
IV. RUNTIME ASSURANCE FOR NON-DETERMINISTIC
CPS
In practice, it is important to consider CPS models which
account for potential system disturbances. We therefore turn
our study toward assuring for non-deterministic systems.
A. Preliminaries and Notation
Reconsider the discrete-time non-deterministic CPS model
(1). We retain the definitions of the system parameters x, u
and d, as well as the associated sets AP , Σ, Σ∗, and Σω ,
from Section 3. Additionally let ϕ denote a mission objective
that is a safety property in LTL.
B. Runtime Assurance in the Presence of Disturbances
We aim to extend our results from Section 3 to assure the
non-deterministic system (1) against ϕ. To that end, we retain
the definition of a backup controller from Section 2, now
applied to (1), and we use the term performance controller
to denote a controller which claims it will keep the system
safe while also meeting some auxiliary objective. Here, we
take the following assumption on the performance control
law, replacing Assumptions III.2:
Assumption IV.1. If requested, the performance
controller can also propose a sequence (Xk, gk),
· · · , (Xk+Nmax , gk+Nmax) of feedback control laws
gi : X → U and regions of the state space Xi ⊆ X , such
that at a future time i, the performance controller intends to
choose its inputs using gi provided the current state of the
system xi ∈ Xi. The performance controller is not obligated
to choose future inputs using these policies.
Note that Assumption IV.1 subsumes Assumption III.2 as a
special case. In particular, the potential sequence of proposed
inputs in Assumption III.2 can be considered a certain static
feedback map gi such that gi(x) = ui for all x.
For an initial state (x0, q0) ∈ S, and a sequence of feed-
back control laws g0, g1, · · ·, we denote the set of reachable
states after i steps by Ri, i.e.
R1 = {(x, q) | x = f(x0, g0(x0), d),
d ∈ D, q = δ(q0, L(x))}
Ri+1 = {(x, q) | x = f(x¯, gi(x¯), d), (x¯, q¯) ∈ Ri,
d ∈ D, q = δ(q¯, L(x))}
for all i > 1. While calculating reachable sets can be compu-
tationally expensive, numerous methods exist to approximate
reachable sets efficiently [16]. Therefore, let R˜i denote an
over-approximation of Ri, i.e. Ri ⊆ R˜i.
Using the approach described in Section 3 as a framework,
we create a procedure which takes a current state (x, q) ∈ S
and returns a sequence of feedback control law γr such that:
1) γr = ∅ signifies a fault in the performance controller,
and
2) γr = g0, · · · , gk signifies that choosing inputs accord-
ing to the sequence of feedback control laws sequential
will return the system to Sb.
We implement this procedure by calling a function RECOV-
ERYD(x, q) (Algorithm 3). In the non-deterministic setting,
we redefine the term recovery input sequence to denote a
sequence of feedback control laws which is guaranteed to
steer the system to a state contained in Sb. Therefore, if
the performance controller is not faulty, then the output of
Algorithm 3 can be thought of as a non-empty recovery input
sequence for the current state.
Algorithm 3 Generate A Non-Empty Recovery Input Se-
quence in the Presence of Disturbances
input : a current state (x, q) ∈ S.
output: a sequence of feedback control laws γr
1: function RECOVERYD(x, q)
2: Initialize: R˜0 = {(x, q)}, i = 0
3: while (i ≤ Nmax) do
4: Xi, gi ← Request Next Control Law
5: if {x | (x, q) ∈ R˜i} 6⊆ Xi then
6: return γr = ∅
7: Compute R˜i+1 using R˜i and gi
8: if (R˜i+1 ⊆ Sb) then
9: return γr = g0, · · · , gi
10: i← i+ 1
11: return γr = ∅
12: end function
We use Algorithm 3 to design a logical architecture for
our safety controller as follows:
1) At each time k the decision logic calls RECOV-
ERYD(xk, qk) and stores the output in a variable γr.
2) If γr is non-empty, then g0(xk) is applied to the system
and g1, · · · , gj is stored to memory.
3) If γr = ∅, then the performance controller has
suggested an input sequence that cannot be verified.
The memorized recovery input sequence is applied to
return the system to Sb, and the backup control input
is then applied for all future time.
This procedure is implemented using Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Runtime Assurance for Non-Deterministic
Discrete-Time Control Systems
1: Initialize: x = x0, q = q0
2: γr ← RECOVERYD(x, q)
3: while (γr 6= ∅) do
4: Apply g0(x) to system;
5: Store g1, · · · , gj to Memory
6: (x, q)← CURRENT STATE
7: γr ← RECOVERYD(x, q)
8: Apply Recovery Input Sequence to system
9: while (True) do
10: Apply BACKUP INPUT to system
Theorem 2 (Runtime Assurance for Non-Deterministic
CPS). Let ϕ ∈ LTL be a safety property, and let w =
L(x0 x1 · · ·) be the trace of an infinite trajectory resulting
from a sequence of inputs chosen using Algorithm 4. If
the system is initialized in the high assurance region, i.e.
(x0, q0) ∈ Sb, then w |= ϕ.
Proof. Let (x0, q0) ∈ Sb be the initial system monitor state.
Therefore q0 6= q⊥. The performance controller is prompted
for a non-empty recovery input sequence γr for the current
state (Line 2, Line 7). If γr = g0, · · · , gN is returned (Line
3), then the u0 = g0(x0) is passed to the system, which
brings the system to a current state (x1, q1), and g1, · · · , gN
is saved to memory as a recovery input sequence for (x1, q1).
The existence of a recovery input sequence for (x1, q1) guar-
antees q1 6= q⊥. It follows inductively that if the performance
controller is always able to supply a recovery input sequence
for the current state, then L(x0 x1 · · ·) |= ϕ. If instead there
exists a finite time k such that the performance controller
is unable to generate a recovery input sequence for (xk, qk)
then the previous recovery input sequence will be applied to
the system and then the backup control input is applied for
all time (Line 8 and 9). This forces the system to remain
in Sb indefinitely and therefore guarantees system safety by
Proposition 2.
Note that when D = ∅, the non-deterministic system
(1) is equivalent to the deterministic system (2). Therefore,
Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 2.
V. CLASSIFYING THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN A PRIORI
DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS
Here, we discuss the feasibility of designing and im-
plementing a safety controller architecture. Specifically, we
address the offline computation involved in constructing a
backup controller and the computational complexity of the
algorithms which run online in the assurance mechanism.
A. Developing a Safety Controller Offline
Two steps are required to construct a safety controller from
an LTL safety specification ϕ and a given system model: the
first step is to convert the system specification to a monitor
automaton and the next step is to design a backup controller.
We refer the reader to [2] for a detailed discussion on
monitor construction. In short, this process involves realizing
two deterministic finite automata (DFAs) and then computing
their minimal product automaton. There are well-defined
procedures for constructing a DFA from an LTL specifica-
tion, as well as procedures for computing product automata
[13]. The resulting DFA is reduced to its minimal form by
removing every unreachable state and every pair of non-
distinguishable states. This procedure is implemented using
Moore’s algorithm [17], which has an average complexity
O(n · log(n)) when minimizing a DFA with n states. This
procedure will only need to be performed once in the CPS
development process.
A backup control law is developed by identifying a
controlled invariant region of the system monitor state space
Sb ⊆ X × Q, such that for all (x, q) ∈ Sb, q 6= q⊥. This
follows from Proposition 2, i.e. in order to ensure system
safety the backup controller must only ensure the system
trace never enters the false monitor state q⊥. In order to
compute such an invariant region of the system monitor state
space, abstraction based methods are possible [14], [18].
B. Online Computation for the Assurance Mechanism
Consider a CPS outfitted with a safety controller archi-
tecture. We would like to characterize the computational
resources which will be necessary online for assurance.
First, we propose that Assumption III.2 (IV.2), which
requires the performance controller to suggest potential
future inputs, fits well with existing control architectures;
for instance, all MPC controllers employ this functionality.
Moreover, since the performance controller is assumed to
be provided in advance of the safety controller construction
process, we do not discuss the computational complexity of
designing a performance controller for a given CPS. Instead,
let us discuss the requisite online computation requirements
of the assurance mechanism and the backup controller.
The assurance mechanism will call Algorithm 1 (or 3)
once per discrete time step, in order to access the per-
formance control input. Therefore, the assurance mecha-
nism must have sufficient computational capabilities to over-
approximate reachable system states at runtime. Reachable
set computation is a very well-studied problem in the con-
trols and hybrid systems literature, with numerous efficient
algorithms. See [19, Chapter 29] for an overview.
C. Discussion
The assurance mechanism will only ever apply a perfor-
mance control input sequence if the set of reachable states
resulting from that sequence is contained inside the high
assurance region. There is, therefore, an intuitive trade-off
between the a priori development of the assurance mecha-
nism and the amount of computational resources which are
necessary online. For example, the likelihood of finding a
safe performance control input sequence is maximized for
safety controllers with large, well developed, high assurance
regions. Similarly, an assurance mechanism which computes
tight approximations of reachable sets will be less likely to
return a fault flag, in comparison to an assurance mecha-
nism which uses conservative approximations. In general,
therefore, developing a comprehensive backup control policy,
will reduce the burden placed on the assurance mechanism at
runtime. This constitutes a trade-off between the a priori de-
velopment of the assurance mechanism and the effectiveness
of the safety controller architecture.
Here we include some additional methods for increasing
the capabilities of the assurance mechanism. In the instance
that the system leaves Sb, with assurance from the per-
formance controller, an assurance mechanism might choose
to expand Sb on the fly with the knowledge of the new
system state and its corresponding recovery input sequence.
As the high assurance region expands, the system will
effectively learn how to stay safe in previously unverified
product states, equivalently increasing system performance.
Safe learning is an active research area in the controls
and formal methods communities. One modern technique,
referred to as shielding, enforces LTL safety properties
in a run-time assurance framework [20]. Shields, however,
only assure discrete-time discrete-state systems, whereas the
safety controller architecture is applicable to systems with a
continuous state space. Shielding also assumes a probabilistic
system disturbance, which we expressly attempt to avoid
in our construction. Additionally, in the instance that the
performance controller is determined to be faulty, Algorithms
2 and 4 first apply the recovery input sequence to the system,
forcing the system monitor trajectory to reenter Sb, and then
pass the backup control input to the system for all time; an
assurance mechanism may instead re-activate the preforming
controller once Sb is reached. In this case, the performance
controller is certainly faulty and may again suggest an unsafe
sequence of inputs at some-point in the future, however, even
in this instance, the safety controller architecture will be able
to assure the system against the mission objective.
VI. CASE STUDY: AN ACCELERATING DELOREAN
A safety controller architecture was implemented on a
modified F1/10 race car (Figure 4a). F1/10 is an open-source
1/10 scale autonomous vehicle test-bed designed primarily
for use by academic researchers [21].
A. System Characterization
When traveling along a straight line, the plant dynamics
of the system conform to a non-deterministic discrete-time
double integrator model. Here the system state at a time
k ∈ N≥0, is described by the car’s position along the road
x(k) ∈ R≥0 and the car’s forward velocity v(k) ∈ R≥0.
Control inputs were suggested by a human operator, who
chose the applied motor torque with a wireless Logitech
Gamepad F710 controller (Figure 4a); this input is therefore
proportional to the experienced acceleration. Additionally, a
non-deterministic factor was included in the system model
in order to encapsulate the effects of drag on the vehicle.
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Fig. 3: MonitorMϕ for ϕ = (¬Tower)U (Tower∧Fast).
Monitor state q? outputs inconclusive.
B. Generating a Safety Controller given a Mission Objective
Our mission objective is taken from the movie Back to
the Future: when the car passes the clock tower, the car’s
velocity must be greater than 2 meters per second. We give
the car, hereafter referred to as a DeLorean, an initial position
(x0, v0) = (0, 0), and arbitrarily place the clock tower a
distance 2.54 meters from the origin.
Without an enforcement mechanism, the human operator
has the ability to suggest an input sequence which causes
the vehicle to pass the clock tower with inadequate speed,
thus violating the mission objective. We therefore design
an assurance mechanism to act as a filter between the the
human operator and the plant, and ensure that the runtime
performance of the DeLorean meets the mission objective.
We convert our system specification to an LTL safety
property as follows. Let AP = {Tower, Fast} be the set
of events, where Tower indicates that the DeLorean has
driven past the clock tower, and Fast indicates that the
velocity of the DeLorean is greater than 2 m/s. The trace of a
system trajectory is therefore given by the labeling function
L : R2 → 2AP
L(x, v) =

∅ x < 2.54, v < 2
Tower x ≥ 2.54, v < 2
Fast x < 2.54, v ≥ 2
Tower ∧ Fast x ≥ 2.54, v ≥ 2.
In order to ensure that the DeLorean does not pass the
clock tower with insufficient velocity, we enforce the LTL
safety specification ϕ = (¬Tower)U (Tower∧Fast) whose
monitor Mϕ is provided in Figure 3. We take Sb to be a
triangular region of the state space from which the DeLorean
can decelerate to zero velocity safely:
Sb = {(x, v, q) | q = q> or v ≤ −0.69x+ 1.66, q = q?}.
In this case, if the DeLorean is in a current state (x, v, q) ∈
Sb, then the backup controller will suggest that the DeLorean
brake such that the vehicle decelerates to a stop. A safety
controller architecture is created by integrating Algorithms
3 and 4 into an assurance mechanism.
C. Case Study Implementation
We present the scenario where the vehicle driver, who
initially suggested safe inputs, suggests an unsafe control
policy (Figure 4b). Performance control inputs are passed
to the system 250 milliseconds after the driver sent them
(a) Experimental test-bed. A human operator suggested per-
formance control inputs to an modified F1/10 race car (right)
using a Logitech Gamepad F710 controller (lower left).
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(b) Safety controller implementation on F1/10 race car. The
safe zone of the backup controller, Sb is shown in green
(Regions 1 and 4). Regions 2, 3, 4 and 5 are labeled ∅,
Fast, Tower ∧ Fast and Tower, respectively. The current
vehicle state is shown in pink. The non-deterministic trajectory
resulting from a memorized recovery input sequence is shown
in green, and the driver’s suggested trajectory, which causes
the system to violate the mission objective, is shown in yellow.
Fig. 4: Case study test-bed and trial data.
via remote control; this lag-time allowed the assurance
mechanism to analyze control inputs as though they were
suggested as a string. The driver first suggested an input
sequence that guaranteed the that DeLorean would satisfy
the mission objective ϕ. This allows the DeLorean to leave
Sb. At a future timestep, the driver suggests a control input
sequence which allowed for the possibility that the DeLorean
would violate ϕ. The assurance mechanism then applies
the memorized recovery input sequence, and the DeLorean
passes the clock tower with sufficient velocity.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduces the safety controller as a runtime
assurance mechanism for system objectives expressed in
linear temporal logic. A case study is presented which details
the construction and implementation of a safety controller on
a non-deterministic cyber-physical system.
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